College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Appellate Briefs

Faculty and Deans

2004

Brief for Amici Curiae Children's Healthcare is a
Legal Duty, National Association of Counsel for
Children, and Nebraska Chapter, American
Academy of Pediatrics
Patrick J. Phipps
James G. Dwyer
William & Mary Law School, jgdwye@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Phipps, Patrick J. and Dwyer, James G., "Brief for Amici Curiae Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, National Association of Counsel
for Children, and Nebraska Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics" (2004). Appellate Briefs. 12.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/briefs/12

Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/briefs

IN THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT

CASE NO. 03-1446

DOUGLAS COUNTY, NEBRASKA
Plaintiff, Appellee,
vs.
JOSUE and MARY ANAYA, husband and wife, as
PARENTS OF ROSA ARIEL ANAYA,
A minor child,
Defendants, Appellants.

BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE CHILDREN’S HEALTHCARE IS A LEGAL DUTY,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, AND
NEBRASKA CHAPTER, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS

Patrick J. Phipps, Esq., 16981
Metcalf Thompson & Phipps
232 Main
Moville, Iowa 51039
(712) 873-3210

James G. Dwyer, Esq.
NY bar reg. # 2179604
Professor of Law
Marshall Wythe School of Law
College of William and Mary
P. O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, Virginia 23187
(757) 221-2685

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities………………………..…………………………………………………….ii
Argument........................................................................................................................................1
I. Parents have no constitutional right to endanger their children’s health…………….……....2
II. Metabolic screening is an important component of health care for all children……………10
III. Rosa Anaya has a constitutional right to equal protection of her interest in avoiding
preventable metabolic disorders………………………………………………………………...12
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………14
Appendix: Description of amici curiae………………………………………………………. .14
Proof of service.…………………………………………………………………………………16

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991)……4
Anderson v. Georgia, 65 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. 1951)………………………………………………….7
Blair v. Supreme Court of State of Wyo., 671 F.2d 389, 390 (10th Cir. 1982)……………………9
Boone v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938, 955 (E.D. Ark. 2002)………………………………......4
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995)……………………...4
Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979)…………………………………………………7, 12
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1025 (1988)………………………………………………………..9
Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964)…………………………………………………7, 8, 9
Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982)…………………………………………………………7
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)…………………………………2, 3, 4, 5, 8
Hobbs v. County of Westchester, 2003 WL 21919882, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)…………………….9
In re Interest of Metteer, 203 Neb. 515, 522, 279 N.W.2d 374, 378 (1979)……………………..9
J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 1997)…………………………………9
Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598 (1968)……………………………6
Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)…………………………………4
Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F.Supp. 470, 479 (M.D. Pa.1996)………………………………………9
McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F.Supp.2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002)…………………………………..7
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)………………………………………………………3, 5
Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 1999)…………………………………………………….4
Mosier v. Barren County Bd. of Health, 215 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1948)……………………………7
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 180 (2nd Cir. 2003)………………………………………9
Palmer v. Palmer, 249 Neb. 814, 820, 545 N.W.2d 751, 756 (1996)…………………………….9

iii

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)………………………………………………3, 5
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)…………………………………………………6, 7
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 134 (1989)…………………9
Sadlock v. Board of Education, 58 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1948)………………………………………...7
State of Fla., Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Friends of Children, Inc.,
653 F.Supp. 1221, 1227 (N.D. Fla.1986)…………………………………………………………9
State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1984)…………………………………….13
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998)……………..4
Swipies v. Kofka, 348 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2003)……………………………………………..9
Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290, 297 (1st Cir. 2003)………………………………………9
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)……………………………3
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)…………………………………………………...3, 4, 5
Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965)……………………………………….7
U.S. v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000)…………………………………………………9

Book
Richard E. Behrman, Robert Kliegman, Hall B. Jenson, eds. Nelson Textbook of Pediatrics, 17th
ed. (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 2004):397-8 and 399-518…………………………………..10

iv

ARGUMENT

The State of Nebraska has decided to put the welfare of children first. Many states allow
some parents to deny their children the important benefit of metabolic screening, but the people
of Nebraska have chosen to guarantee all children this benefit. This Court has no reason to take
the bold step Appellants urge, of nullifying a considered judgment of the legislature that avoiding lifelong suffering or death is a sufficient justification for applying a simple, needle-prick test
to all newborn children regardless of the religious beliefs some parents might have.
If constitutional arguments of the sort Appellants proffer were to succeed, not just metabolic screening but also numerous other state efforts to protect the welfare of children could be
stymied by dissenting parents. Fortunately, those arguments do not accurately reflect the law
today, which requires, at most, simply that the state show a real benefit to children and an effort
to secure that benefit with minimal intrusion into family life. Appellants do not question the
state legislature’s determination that metabolic screening is generally beneficial. Rather, they
take the position that parents have a right to deny their own children that benefit. For the Court
to adopt this position would require ignoring established constitutional doctrine rather than
applying it. It would also require disregarding the interests and rights of children, who themselves have no religious objection to being tested for metabolic disorders.
The Amici child welfare organizations demonstrate below that Appellants’ constitutional
objection to the Nebraska metabolic screening rests throughout on a misunderstanding and
mischaracterization of existing Supreme Court doctrine; that the metabolic screening Nebraska
guarantees all children is important to the welfare of children in the State; and that Rosa Anaya
herself has a right that Appellants entirely ignore—namely, a right not to be denied a stateconferred health benefit for reasons that have nothing to do with her own interests or choices.
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I.

PARENTS HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ENDANGER
THEIR CHILDREN’S HEALTH.

Contrary to the assertions of both Appellants and Appellee, the District Court did implicitly find that the state metabolic screening law burdened Appellants’ parental rights. The District Court stated that if a state law infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right, then strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review (Order at 3), and then proceeded to apply strict
scrutiny to this case (Order at 4-5). The District Court perceived a conflict between the parents’
free exercise of religion and the state’s effort to guard the health of children (Order at 4), but
held that the state was justified in “limiting parental freedom” in this way (Order at 5). The court
could have held simply that the law does not burden Appellants’ free exercise of religion, because it pertains to the health of Rosa Anaya rather than to Appellants’ religious activities, but it
did not do so.
The District Court was also overly generous to Appellants in concluding that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review in free exercise cases like this one, where the challenged
state law is religiously neutral and generally applicable. The United States Supreme Court
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), established a contrary rule, as
Appellants acknowledge. In Smith, the Supreme Court held: "The right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)." Id. at 879. After Smith, religiously neutral and generally applicable laws are subject only to rational basis review, under which a state must show just that a law serves some state
interest reasonably well. Appellants do not contend that Nebraska’s metabolic screening law,
which is religiously neutral and generally applicable, would not pass rational basis review.
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In addition, the Supreme Court has never held that parental rights to child-rearing freedom under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment trigger strict scrutiny. See
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the other Justices who joined in the Court’s plurality decision did not state that strict scrutiny applies in
parental substantive due process cases). In the only decisions of the Court prior to Troxel
involving just a substantive due process claim to freedom in childrearing, Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court found that
the challenged laws served no state interest, so they would not pass rational basis review. And in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a pre-Smith decision involving both a parental substantive due process claim and a free exercise claim, the Court implied that a substantive due
process claim itself triggers only rational basis review, by stating that “when the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more
than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State’ is
required…” Id. at 233.
In the absence of authority for applying strict scrutiny on the basis of a free exercise
claim or on the basis of a substantive due process claim, Appellants put forward the “hybrid
rights” claim that is the last resort of every free exercise plaintiff seeking exemption from a
clearly legitimate law. They contend that when a free exercise claim is joined with a parental
substantive due process claim the standard of review is elevated to strict scrutiny. The only
authority Appellants proffer for the viability of such a claim after Smith is language in the Smith
opinion itself, which Appellants accord undue significance by stating that “[t]he Court in Smith
noted that the compelling state interests standard still applies when a party’s free exercise of
religion claim is coupled with other constitutional protections, making a hybrid claim.”
(Appellants’ Brief at 10).
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In fact, there is only dictum in Smith suggesting that constitutional rights claims might
have some additive effective; there was no hybrid claim recognized in Smith. 494 U.S. at 88182. Such dictum does not amount to a statement or holding of “the Court.” Rather, it constitutes
simply the musings of one Justice and has no precedential value. Subsequent to Smith, “the
Court” has never adopted the hybrid rights idea, and lower courts adjudicating free exercise
cases have consistently rejected hybrid rights-based demands for strict scrutiny, in parents’ rights
cases and in other contexts. See, e.g., San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360
F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (rights to free speech and assembly); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1999) (right to travel); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700
(10th Cir. 1998) (parents’ rights); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st
Cir. 1995) (parents’ rights); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)
(rights to free speech and free press) ; American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961
F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991) (substantive due process "right to employ"); Boone v. Boozman,
217 F.Supp.2d 938, 955 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (parents’ rights). The Sixth Circuit, in explaining why
it rejected the very idea of a higher standard of review for so-called “hybrid-rights claims,”
stated: “Such an outcome is completely illogical; therefore, at least until the Supreme Court
holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other
constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard than that used in
Smith to evaluate generally applicable, exceptionless state regulations under the Free Exercise
Clause.” Kissinger, 5 F.3rd at 180.
Appellants are correct that prior to Smith the Supreme Court applied some form of heightened review in free exercise cases, including those, like Yoder, involving parental religious objections to state child welfare laws. Notably, however, in no case has the United States Supreme
Court ever held that parents have a right under the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or the two
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amendments in combination, to an exemption from state laws that would benefit their children.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), on which Appellants place great reliance,
the Court rested its decision on a supposition that compelling Amish children to attend school
beyond the eighth grade would not benefit them, and therefore recognizing a right of Amish
parents to a partial exemption from the compulsory education laws would have no adverse effect
on the children. 406 U.S. at 229-30. The Court stated: “This case, of course, is not one in which
any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or
welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred.” 406 U.S. at 230. Importantly, the
Court suggested that it would have reached an opposite decision if any danger to the children’s
interests were shown:
To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be
subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens. But in this
case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence undermining the arguments the
State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of the child and society as
a whole. The record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious objections of the
Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory education will not
impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be selfsupporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other
way materially detract from the welfare of society. 406 U.S. at 233-34.
Likewise, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held in favor of parents after finding that the state laws in
question—a law effectively banning private schooling and a law banning instruction in a foreign
language—did nothing to benefit children. See 268 U.S. at 534 (noting that nothing in the record
indicated any educational deprivation of students at private schools), 262 U.S. at 403 (concluding
that the prohibition on German language instruction was “arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state,” because “there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health”).
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Importantly, in the two cases where the Supreme Court believed the challenged state laws
did serve to protect the health interests of children, the Court held in favor of the state. In Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which remains the controlling Supreme Court precedent
on conflicts between parental religious beliefs and state measures to protect children’s health, the
Court upheld a state law prohibiting parents from involving their children in distribution of leaflets on the streets after dark, against a claim that this law interfered with parents’ free exercise of
religion. Avoiding potential harm to children was all the justification the state needed to survive
heightened judicial scrutiny in that case. Likewise, in Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County
Hospital, 390 U.S. 598 (1968), the Court affirmed a lower court decision that applied Prince to
order blood transfusions for a child needing surgery, over the free exercise objection of
Jehovah’s Witness parents.
Contrary to Appellants’ suggestions (Appellants’ Brief at 12), the Court in Prince did not
rely principally on potential dangers to the general public in reaching its holding, and the Court
did not say that parents might sometimes prevent the state from protecting children’s health and
welfare. After articulating the free exercise interests of parents, the Court stated:
Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society
to protect the welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that end, made
here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things were involved. The last is no mere
corporate concern of official authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for
growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens. 321 U.S. at 165.
The Court justified its holding by explaining: “Acting to guard the general interest in youth's
well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control…,” and “the state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare.” 321 U.S. at 166-67. The Court was thus clearly focused primarily on the health and
safety of children.
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In suggesting that the Prince Court envisioned cases where parents might be entitled to
deny their children meaningful legal protections, Appellants misquote the Court’s opinion. In
the indented quotation on page 12 of their initial Brief, Appellants omit three crucial words near
the end of the sentence. The Court in fact said:
Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents. We neither lay the foundation “for any [that is every] state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of
children in religion” which may be done “in the name of their health or welfare” nor give
warrant for “every limitation on their religious training and activities.” 321 U.S. at 171.
The italicized words in this passage, which Appellants deleted in their brief, suggest a
concern on the part of the Court that states would claim that their laws benefit children when in
fact they do not. Appellants make no pretense that the metabolic screening law does not benefit
children. Moreover, this passage is focused on religious education and religious activities that
parents might undertake, to pass on their beliefs, while metabolic screening has no impact on
Appellants’ teaching of their children or involving of their children in religious activities.
As Appellants acknowledge, the Court in Prince referred specifically and favorably to
state compulsory immunization laws, which require a preventive measure for children who are
not presently manifesting disease or impairment. 321 U.S. at 166. Numerous lower court rulings
since Prince have in fact upheld state immunization laws in the face of parental religious
objections. See, e.g., Boone v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002); McCarthy v.
Boozman, 212 F.Supp.2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002); Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982);
Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979); Anderson v. Georgia, 65 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. 1951);
Wright v. DeWitt Sch. Dist., 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965); Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark.
1964); Mosier v. Barren County Bd. of Health, 215 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1948); Sadlock v. Board of
Education, 58 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1948). And in Smith, Justice Scalia favorably cited one of these
decisions, in listing various kinds of general “civil obligations” from which he believed
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individuals have no right to an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause. 494 U.S. at 888-89
(citing Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964).
In these and other cases, the Supreme Court and lower courts, including this Court, have
consistently recognized that protecting the welfare of children is a compelling state interest,
sufficient to justify even removing a child altogether from a parent’s custody. See, e.g., Palmer v.
Palmer, 249 Neb. 814, 820, 545 N.W.2d 751, 756 (1996) (referring to “the compelling end of the
best interests of the child”); In re Interest of Metteer, 203 Neb. 515, 522, 279 N.W.2d 374, 378
(1979) (termination of parental rights). See also Sable Communications of California, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 134 (1989) (prohibition on obscene interstate commercial telephone
messages); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1025 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (protection of
child witnesses); Swipies v. Kofka, 348 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 2003) (removal of child from
parental custody); Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290, 297 (1st Cir. 2003) (removal of abused
children from home); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 180 (2nd Cir. 2003) (removal of
abused child from home); U.S. v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000) (prosecution for
possession of child pornography); J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 1997)
(removal of abused child from home); Blair v. Supreme Court of State of Wyo., 671 F.2d 389,
390 (10th Cir. 1982) (termination of parental rights); Hobbs v. County of Westchester, 2003 WL
21919882, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (restrictions on activities of convicted sex offender); Klemka v.
Nichols, 943 F.Supp. 470, 479 (M.D. Pa.1996) (mother arrested while in church for child
endangerment); State of Fla., Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Friends of Children,
Inc., 653 F.Supp. 1221, 1227 (N.D. Fla.1986) (objection to home studies by adoption agency).
Moreover, the evidence presented in the District Court established that there is today no
reasonable alternative to a blood test for metabolic screening. The metabolic screening law
would therefore have to be upheld even if strict scrutiny appropriately applied.
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Appellants attempt to distinguish metabolic screening from immunization on the basis of
how imminent the feared harm is. (Appellants’ Brief at 13) But the distinction they would draw
is illusory. Both measures guard against something that could cause a child to become ill,
impaired, or dead. In fact, the danger of harm is arguably more imminent when it is inside a
person’s body already—as is the case with neonatal metabolic disorders—than when it is in the
child’s external environment. As discussed further in the next section, there is no questioning
the imminence of the harm for children who are in fact born with PKU, biotinidase deficiency,
galactosemia, or MCAD deficiency. Whether any given baby has in fact been born with one of
these disorders can only be determined by administering the test. The low probability of any
given baby having a metabolic disorder also cannot serve to distinguish metabolic screening
from immunization, because some of the diseases for which children must be immunized are
ones, such as polio, that any given U.S. child has almost no chance of ever contracting. And the
usual consequences of many metabolic disorders are much more serious than the usual
consequences of some illnesses against which children are typically immunized, such as chicken
pox or measles.
Appellants rely illogically on the fact that most states include a religious exemption in
their metabolic screening laws, as evidence that metabolic screening is actually not so important
for children. It does not follow from the prevalence of exemptions that they are appropriate, let
alone that they are constitutionally required. States decide not to do many things that they could
do to protect people’s welfare, especially when those they might protect are politically powerless
and when there is a vocal group of people who want to deny that protection. Nebraska has
instead decided to protect politically powerless children, even over the objection of some insistent parents. Appellants point to no explicit statements by any legislature or court that metabolic
screening does not serve a compelling state interest or that metabolic screening does not guard
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against imminent harm or that metabolic screening is less important than immunization.
Legislative history indicates that the Nebraska legislature has made a conscious and
thoughtful decision to require metabolic screening without a religious exception. The test was
first required in 1967 without a religious exemption. In 1979 a religious exemption was added,
but the legislature removed it in 1983. In 2003 members of the Church of Scientology asked the
legislature to allow a delay in metabolic screening because their religion teaches that babies
should not have any procedures or hear any sounds for the first days of their life. LB714 was
introduced to accommodate them, but it did not pass.
LB714 illustrates the Pandora’s box that religious exemptions open. Scientologists want
only a delay in metabolic testing while the Anayas want to be allowed to refuse the test completely. Other religions want an exemption from wearing bicycle helmets and in two states have
gotten it. Penn. Stat. Title 75 §3510(b)(3); Ore. Rev. Stat. 814.487 The Christian Science
church seeks religious exemptions from all medical care of children. Delaware has enacted a
religious defense to first-degree murder, Arkansas has a religious defense to capital murder, and
four other states have religious defenses to murder or manslaughter. Ark. Code 5-10-101(a)(9),
Del. Code Title 11 § 1103(c) and 1104, Ia. Code 726.6(d), Ore. Rev. Stat. 163.206, 163.115(4),
163.118(b)(3); Ohio Rev. Code 2919.22A; W.V. Code 61-8D-2(d)
II.

METABOLIC SCREENING IS AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF
HEALTH CARE FOR ALL CHILDREN.

Amici’s position is that screening of newborns should be required only when it meets the
following conditions:
1. The disease detected by the screening has significant mortality and morbidity among
children when not diagnosed pre-symptomatically
2. The disease is not consistently identified by symptoms in the neonatal period
3. The prevalence of the disease in the child population is significant
4. The baby can benefit from pre-symptomatic treatment
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5. A simple, minimally invasive screening method that carries no reasonable risk of
physical harm is available
6. The screening method is sensitive and specific
7. A reliable means for reporting results exists
8. The purpose of the screening is explained to the parents, and resources for treatment
and counseling are available
9. The family’s right to confidentiality is protected. See CHILD newsletter 2003 #1
Nebraska’s metabolic screening law meets all of the above requirements. Medical
treatment, often consisting simply of dietary manipulation or small doses of thyroid hormone,
prevents the damage from the metabolic disorders detected by the test when it is initiated before
symptoms appear. Without treatment, severe consequences result, including mental retardation,
growth retardation, failure to thrive, liver disease, oxygen-carrying difficulties, and sudden infant
death. See Richard E. Behrman, Robert Kliegman, Hall B. Jenson, eds. Nelson Textbook of
Pediatrics, 17th ed. (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 2004):397-8 and 399-518. For example, children born with the metabolic disorder phenylketonuria who do not receive treatment in time may
become “hyperactive with purposeless movements, rhythmic rocking, and athetosis.” Id. at 399.
Metabolic disorders typically do not manifest symptomatically in time for effective treatment. While a baby is in utero, a mother’s metabolism corrects that of the baby, so the baby is
born apparently normal even if it does carry a metabolic disorder. After birth, however, metabolic poisons accumulate, brain growth retards, and brain damage may ensue. Yet it might be
years before the child’s mental handicaps are observed. Id. at 398. Alternatively, enzymes which
are deficient because of a metabolic disorder may function in the baby after birth, but at a low
level. The baby will seem fine when unstressed, but even minor to moderate stress, such as from
a cold, can cause major metabolic decompensation that leads to serious illness or even sudden
death. Id.
The metabolic screening is therefore necessary to detect metabolic disorders in time to
prevent permanent harm to the child. In addition, the screening is minimally invasive. Only a
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few drops of blood are needed to test for all the diseases listed in Nebraska’s law.
III.

ROSA ANAYA HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF HER INTEREST IN AVOIDING PREVENTABLE
METABOLIC DISORDERS.

What neither of the parties to this litigation has considered is that Rosa Anaya might
herself have a right at stake in this matter. It is her health, after all, and the health of other
children in a similar position in Nebraska, that is in question. The state’s metabolic screening
law is designed for their protection, and the ultimate issue in this case is whether they will
receive the protection that the legislature decided to give them.
For this Court to empower Appellants to countermand the legislature and prevent Rosa
from receiving the protection of the metabolic screening law would be effectively to treat her as
less deserving than other children of the protections afforded by state child welfare laws. Such
judicial action would constitute a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, which prohibits state actors from denying the protections of the law
to particular citizens without strong justification. And there is no support in constitutional
precedent for the proposition that someone else’s wishes can supply such justification.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979),
recognized that parental religious claims to exemption from child welfare laws—in that case, a
compulsory immunization law—amount to a demand that the state deny certain children the
equal protection of the law. “A child,” wrote the Court, “is indeed himself an individual,
although under certain disabilities until majority, with rights in his own person which must be
respected and may be enforced.” The Court further held that “innocent children, too young to
decide for themselves” should not “be denied the protection against crippling and death that
immunization provides because of [their parents’] religious belief” and struck down a religious
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exemption in the State’s compulsory immunization laws as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. 378 So.2d at 222.
Similarly, in State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1984), an Ohio court
held that the religious defense in the State’s felony child endangerment law violated the equal
protection rights of children whose parents relied on it. The court stated:
This special protection [of medical care] should be guaranteed to all such children until
they have their own opportunity to make life’s important religious decisions for themselves upon attainment of the age of reason. After all, given the opportunity when grown
up, a child may someday choose to reject the most sincerely held of his parents’ religious
beliefs, just as the parents on trial here have apparently grown to reject some beliefs of
their parents. Equal protection should not be denied to innocent babies, whether under
the label of “religious freedom” or otherwise. 490 N.E.2d at 935-36
A newborn has no religious objection to a blood test. Mental retardation or death would
rob Rosa Anaya of the opportunity to become an autonomous person, to make decisions for
herself about religious belief and about the kind of life she will lead. The metabolic screening
that Nebraska requires can prevent such a profound loss, and no one has a right to take that
protection away from Rosa Anaya or from any other child.
CONCLUSION
This is not an exceptional case. Any aspect of any state’s child welfare laws can conflict
with some parents’ religious beliefs, given the infinite variety of religious beliefs people can
adopt. The Nebraska legislature has wisely refused to enact religious exemptions from civil and
criminal child abuse and neglect laws and from its metabolic screening requirement. This Court
should not establish a precedent that parents are entitled to an exemption from any child welfare
laws to which they claim to have a religious objection.
Such a precedent would greatly complicate state efforts to promote the welfare of children. It would also result in suffering, disease, bodily damage, and death to some children. The
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State of Nebraska unquestionably has a compelling interest in preventing mental retardation,
other disabling conditions, and death of its children. It has acted to serve this interest by
requiring metabolic screening since 1967, and the state legislature has made a considered
judgment that a religious exemption would be contrary to this compelling interest. Parents have
no legal or moral entitlement to override this legislative judgment or to subject any child to the
danger of such harm. On the contrary, Rosa Anaya has a right not to be denied an important
protection that other children receive.
The Amici child welfare organizations do not question the good intentions of parents like
the Anayas, but no one’s good intentions entitle them to deny other persons legal protections that
the state has granted. Although Mr. and Mrs. Anaya might not appreciate it, laws like that
mandating metabolic screening of children actually benefit parents as well—all parents—by
increasing the likelihood that they can share with their children in a long and healthy life.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF AMICI CURIAE
Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty (CHILD) is a tax-exempt educational organization with approximately 450 members in 42 states and four foreign countries. CHILD’s
mission is to stop religion-related child abuse and neglect. CHILD provides information to
public officials, scholars, and others; supports research, publishes a newsletter, files lawsuits,
files amicus curiae briefs, and does a limited amount of lobbying. Its officers and honorary
members have won many awards for their child advocacy work, including the NACC Outstanding Legal Advocacy Award and Child Advocacy Service Awards by several chapters of the
American Academy of Pediatrics. CHILD is a member of the National Child Abuse Coalition.
The National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) is an IRC 501 (c) (3) notfor-profit child advocacy and professional membership association with approximately 2000
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members representing all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The mission of the NACC is to
improve outcomes for America’s court-involved children. NACC programs include professional
training and technical assistance, programs to establish the practice of law for children as a legal
specialty, and policy advocacy. The NACC has appeared as amicus curiae in many state and
federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court of the United States. The NACC enters a case
only after a careful review process by the NACC Amicus Curiae Committee and its Board of
Directors. The NACC is the recipient of the Meritorious Service to the Children of America
Award presented by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. NACC staff
members have received the ABA National Child Advocacy Award and the Kempe Award.
NACC programs have received the support of the U.S. Dept. of HHS Children’s Bureau, the
ABA, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the Child Welfare League of America.
The Nebraska Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics is a member-based, nonprofit organization, composed of nearly three hundred, primary care and sub-specialist
pediatricians. The mission of the Nebraska Chapter, American Academy of Pediatrics is to
promote the physical, mental, and social health of all infants, children, adolescents, and young
adults; to foster camaraderie and cooperation among pediatricians and pediatric subspecialists
within the state for the advancement of the practice of pediatrics; to engage in child advocacy
efforts, education, and service to improve the systems that serve and the policies that impact
children; to further the policies and the objectives of the American Academy of Pediatrics at the
state and local level.
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